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TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT: THE SUPREME COURT'S
REGULATORY TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE AFTER TAHoE-
SIERRA
JUSTIN W. STEMPLE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Private property may not be taken for a public use without payment of
just compensation.' This Note involves the Supreme Court's latest decision
in regulatory takings, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Re-
gional Planning Agency.2 The case has an important place in regulatory
takings jurisprudence, but the holding is narrow by the writ of certiorari
granted which considered only "[w]hether the Court of Appeals properly
determined that a temporary moratorium on land development does not
constitute a taking of property requiring compensation under the Takings
Clause of the United States Constitution."3 This Note will discuss the pos-
sibility of greater application of the Tahoe-Sierra rationale to direct the
litigation of regulatory takings claims for moratoria, permit delays, and
permanent denials of use to be decided under a Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City4 analysis. The ripeness doctrine in regulatory takings
jurisprudence has merely pre-decided a Penn Central balance, as has the
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council' exception.6 Those rules create a
cluttered jurisprudence that could be streamlined and simplified by the es-
tablishment of the Penn Central factors as the sole test in regulatory takings
jurisprudence, and then undergoing an in-depth explanation of those factors
"I would like to thank Professor Eric Kades for his helpful comments in preparing this Note,
and my wife Kristel for her love and support. Mr. Stemple is a 2004 J.D. candidate attending
the College of William and Mary School of Law. He received a B.A. from Alma College in
2001.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
535 U.S. 302 (2002).
533 U.S. 948, 948-49 (2001).
4 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
5 05 U.S. 1003 (1992).
6 Lucas created an exception to the use of the Penn Central factors for those regulations that
deny an owner all "economically productive or beneficial uses" of the regulated property. Id.
at 1030.
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to provide guidance for lower courts. The scope of this Note is limited to
regulatory takings, and does not include those areas of takings jurisprudence
covering physical occupation7 or the nuisance rule.8
Part II provides suggestions for simplifying regulatory takings juris-
prudence and describes how the Penn Central factors alone are capable of
addressing the concerns reflected in other cases and doctrines, including
regulatory takings ripeness and the Lucas exception. Part III.A. lays out the
factual background of Tahoe-Sierra and what created the dispute that led to
litigation. Part IH.B. summarizes the lengthy procedural history of Tahoe-
Sierra. Part lII.C. addresses regulatory takingsjurisprudence by summarizing
major takings cases and by applying Tahoe-Sierra where appropriate. Part IV
analyzes subsequent lower court decisions for the effect of Tahoe-Sierra,
based on the assumption that the importance and impact of Supreme Court
decisions can best be marked by their effect on how lower courts decide
cases. Part V concludes by stating that Tahoe-Sierra was important for its
acknowledgment of Penn Central as the appropriate test for regulatory
takings claims. Tahoe-Sierra was especially important for environmental
planners because it affirmed, and did not abandon or weaken, the parcel as
a whole rule. The Court in Tahoe-Sierra affirmed rules that allow en-
vironmental protection to continue addressing fundamental environmental
issues as wetlands regulation, protection of endangered species, and land use
policies.
II. SIMPLIFYING AND SOLIDIFYING A SINGLE REGULATORY TAKINGS
STANDARD
The Supreme Court has identified many factors that are to be weighed
in determining a regulatory takings claim, but those factors can all be accom-
modated through the exclusive application of the Penn Central factors.
Although the Court in Tahoe-Sierra stated that Penn Central was the proper
test to resolve a regulatory takings claim, the Court should explicitly incor-
porate the concerns reflected in the myriad of factors available in regulatory
takingsjurisprudence into the Penn Central factors, and provide clarification
' Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that any
physical occupation, regardless of duration or degree, is a per se taking).
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (holding that a law barring the operation of
a brick mill in residential areas is not a taking).
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on how the three factors adequately address the concerns reflected in the
other factors.
A. Concerns Reflected by the Ripeness Requirement are Taken Into
Account in a Penn Central Analysis
The initial issue a court hearing a regulatory takings claim addresses is
ripeness, but a determination of ripeness can easily be incorporated into Penn
Central's character of governmental action factor.9 The ripeness doctrine
addresses the need to ensure that decision-making delays inherent in govern-
mental action, such as permit delays and zoning changes, are finalized to
prevent premature litigation." Doing so ensures a factually certain back-
ground from which the court may rule.
These concerns can be dealt with adequately under the character of
governmental action factor. The character of a permit delay would merely
be a regulation under the police power of the state. The concerns about
extraordinary delay and bad faith on the part of government officials reflected
in Wyatt v. United States 1 can be addressed by analyzing the character of
the government's action on a spectrum. At one end would be the typical
permitting delay associated with any permitting regime. At the other end
would be a finalized permit denial which has all the characteristics of a
governmental action explicitly denying certain use for the property. Litigation
brought while awaiting a final decision on a permit would fail to present a
valid Penn Central claim during a reasonable delay. The length of delay, bad
faith by the officials processing the permit, or any extenuating circumstances
would allow the court to adjust the weight accorded to the character of
governmental action factor appropriately to account for the particular
circumstances of the case without creating categorical rules and exceptions
which are inappropriate in the justice-based takings arena.
B. Agins v. City of Tiburon Factors
Agins v. City of Tiburon" factors should never be applied by a court,
because those concerns are taken into account under Penn Central. Applying
9 See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
'o See infra Part III.C. 1.
" 271 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see infra Part III.C.I.c.
12 447 U.S. 255 (1979).
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separate sets of factors in similar cases has the effect of causing confusion for
lower courts attempting to synthesize Supreme Court decisions.
Agins identified two situations 3 in which the Court determined a reg-
ulatory taking had occurred, but those two prongs can be taken into account
in a Penn Central balance. The first prong, substantially advancing legitimate
state interests, addresses the concern that government action could arbitrarily
"take" property without a legitimate reason and without com-pensation to the
property owner. 4 Regardless of Agins, however, that concern must be
weighed under Penn Central if the character of governmental action is taken
seriously. A court could not address a claim arising from an arbitrary
government action that had no relation to a legitimate state interest and
determine that the character of governmental action did not weigh so heavily
in favor of the property owner that compensation was due. Any other decision
would warp the scales balancing the private and public interests. The need
for clarification in regulatory takings jurisprudence would be enhanced by
directing lower courts to address the concerns reflected in Agins' first prong
in the context of the Penn Central balancing test. Doing so would streamline
the jurisprudence while justly considering the legitimate concern reflected in
Agins' first prong.
Agins' second prong is that compensation is due when a regulation
"denies an owner economically viable use of his land."' 5 The obvious concern
of the second prong is that when regulations destroy all economic benefits an
owner can derive from the regulated property, the Fifth Amendment requires
compensation as the value of the property has in effect been taken away.16
That concern was explicitly recognized in Penn Central's first factor, the
economic impact of the regulation on the property owner. 7 When the Penn
Central analysis addresses a regulation that destroys all economic use of a
property, the first factor must weigh strongly in favor of the property owner.
Without the other factors weighing strongly against compensation, compen-
sation is required.
I3 Id. at 260 ("The application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking
if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests,"quoting Nectow v.
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928), "or denies an owner economically viable use of his
land," quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 138, n. 36 (1978)).
14 Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-63.
15 Id. at 260.
16 ld. at 262-63.
17 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131.
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C. Abandoning the Lucas Exception
The Supreme Court in Lucas essentially created a predetermined Penn
Central balance by ruling, on the basis of Agins' second prong, that a per se
rule existed requiring compensation whenever a regulation denied an owner
economically beneficial use. 8 While it is questionable whether the regulation
in Lucas actually denied the owner all economic use of the land, 19 the Court
identified a concern that when a regulation acts so strongly against individual
property owners as to deny them the economic benefits of their property, the
Fifth Amendment requires compensation.20 That concern can be, should be,
and is reflected in a Penn Central balancing test. The identification of Lucas
as a predetermined balancing test illuminates how its categorical rule is
unnecessary. This is especially true when the facts in Lucas likely fail its own
holding when applied based on a plain reading of the case.2 The economic
impact of a regulation should be proportional to the economic use it denies
the property owner, as the traditional Penn Central test requires. The failure
of Lucas to even meet its own holding demonstrates that it is almost
impossible to imagine a regulation which actually denies a property owner all
economic use of his property without becoming essentially a physical
appropriation. Penn Central's analysis can adequately address the legitimate
concern reflected in Lucas without the need for a separate test.
'8 See infra Part III.C.2.e.
As noted by Justice Harry Blackmun in dissent, the property retained some value for use
as a private beach and recreational area. Although the value would be extremely reduced
from its value as developable property, it would still not fit within a plain meaning definition
of the text of Lucas, which required all economically beneficial use to be denied. The
"[p]etitioner still can enjoy other attributes of ownership, such as the right to exclude others,
'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property."' Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1043-44 (1992) (Blackmun, J.
dissenting) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). "Petitioner
can picnic, swim, camp in a tent, or live on the property in a movable trailer. State courts
frequently have recognized that land has economic value where the only residual economic
uses are recreation or camping." Id. Blackmun cited state decisions reflecting that value.
"Petitioner also retains the right to alienate the land, which would have value for neighbors
and for those prepared to enjoy proximity to the ocean without a house." Id.
20 Id. at 1015.
2 Lucas essentially removes from the Penn Central analysis those cases in which the
economic impact was so severe the Court determined a taking should always result. A Penn
Central analysis of Lucas would give appropriate weight to the severe economic loss
incurred in Lucas while also giving due respect to the character of the governmental action
and the investment backed expectations of the property owner.
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D. Penn Central Properly Considers and Weighs All Relevant Factors
Penn Central's test adequately addresses the concerns reflected in
regulatory takings' ripeness doctrine, the Lucas categorical exception, and
the Agins prongs. When two options are available and both are capable of
resolving an issue with similar results, but only one option contains juris-
prudential benefits such as clarifying and simplifying the jurisprudence and
giving clear notice to potential litigants regarding what factors and concerns
the court will address, the choice should be simple.
Justice Stevens' support of utilizing Penn Central in all regulatory
takings cases, despite his acknowledgment of the Lucas exception, laid the
foundation for future Courts to solidify the Penn Central factors as the sole
test for takings claims.'2 Penn Central should be established as the sole
determinative test in regulatory takings jurisprudence for its ability to address
all of the concerns reflected in regulatory takings cases while simplifying the
jurisprudence for future litigants and courts.
HII. TAHOE-SIERRA
A. Factual Background
Lake Tahoe has been recognized as an American "national treasure."23
Its exceptional clarity has been acknowledged by artist and politician alike.24
22See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,321-
27 (2002).
23 Kelly v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 855 P.2d 1027, 1034 (1993).
24 See e.g., MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 169 (Shelley Fisher Fishkin ed., Oxford University
Press 1996) (1872). Lake Tahoe is
a noble sheet ofblue water lifted six thousand three hundred feet above the
level of the sea, and walled in by a rim of snow-clad mountain peaks, that
towered aloft full three thousand feet higher still! ... As it lay there with
the shadows of the mountains brilliantly photographed upon its still
surface I thought it must surely be the fairest picture the whole earth
affords.
Id," see also Sean Whaley, Clinton Pledges Tahoe Aid, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., July 27, 1997,
at 1A (President William Clinton said Lake Tahoe is "one of the crownjewels, unique among
them all. It's a national treasure that must be protected and preserved."); Sean Whaley, Gore
Vows to Protect Lake, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., July 26, 1997, at IA (Vice President Al Gore
said, "There is a peace that is associated with Lake Tahoe that is very, very special .... The
beauty of this place is unique in all the world."). Another important aspect is that:
Only two other sizable lakes in the world are of comparable
quality--Crater Lake in Oregon, which is protected as part of the Crater
[Vol. 28:163
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The exceptional clarity that fostered Lake Tahoe's popularity has led to its
potential destruction by increased development around the lake. Develop-
ments result in
increased nutrient loading of the lake largely because of the
increase in impervious coverage of land in the Basin resulting
from that development. Impervious coverage-such as
asphalt, concrete, buildings, and even packed dirt-prevents
precipitation from being absorbed by the soil. Instead, the
water is gathered and concentrated by such coverage. Larger
amounts of water flowing off a driveway or a roof have more
erosive force than scattered raindrops falling over a dispersed
area-especially one covered with indigenous vegetation,
which softens the impact of the raindrops themselves.
Apparently, even the force of a raindrop falling on bare earth
has some erosive power, which the presence of vegetation
mitigates. Thus disruptions to the natural plant cover caused
by development further exacerbate the problem. The increase
in impervious coverage seems to be a larger problem than the
loss of plant cover, however-perhaps because so much of
the Basin's precipitation falls in the form of snow. One can
only assume that a snowflake impacts the ground with less
force than a raindrop. Yet runoff from the melting snow still
produces erosion.
The concentrations of water running off areas of imper-
vious coverage then flow rapidly over areas of uncovered
earth, picking up nutrient-rich topsoil and bits of vegetation
and debris as they go. The increase in runoff thus causes more
debris and soil-and hence more nitrogen and phos-
phorous-to reach the lake than under natural conditions.25
Lake National Park, and Lake Baikal in the [former] Soviet Union. Only
Lake Tahoe, however, is so readily accessible from large metropolitan
centers and is so adaptable to urban development.
S. REP. No. 91-510, at 4 (1969).
25 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226,
1231 (D. Nev. 1999).
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The addition of nitrogen and phosphorous spurs eutrophication, which the
district court described as
the process of becoming more "eutrophic," which, at least as
it relates to a lake, is defined as "rich in dissolved nutrients.
... .... [The District Court projected that] [e]ventually,
unless the process is stopped, the lake will lose its clarity and
its trademark blue color, becoming green and opaque for
eternity. Or at least, for a very, very long time. Estimates are
that, should the lake turn green, it could take over 700 years
for it to return to its natural state, if that were ever possible at
all.26
In response to the dangers posed to Lake Tahoe's clarity by increased
development, the states of Nevada and California created the Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency ("TRPA") in 1969.27 On June 25, 1981, TRPA enacted
Ordinance 81-5 to allow time to determine what amount of growth could be
sustained without damaging Lake Tahoe's clarity.28 No regional plan was
developed by TRPAs original deadline,29 so TRPA passed Resolution 83-21
out of concern that it no longer had authority to issue construction permits.30
Resolution 87-21, together with Ordinance 81-5, prohibited construction on
"sensitive lands in California and on all [Stream Environment Zone] lands 31
26 d. (citation omitted).
27 Id. at 1232.
28 Id. at 1233-34.
29 Id. at 1235.
30 Id.
3' Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 308
(2002).
"Stream Environment Zones" (SEZs) are especially vulnerable to the
impact of development because, in their natural state, they act as filters for
much of the debris that runoff carries. Because "[tlhe most obvious
response to this problem ... is to restrict development around the lake-
especially in SEZ lands, as well as in areas already naturally prone to
runoff," . . . conservation efforts have focused on controlling growth in
these high hazard areas.
Id. (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp.
2d 1226, 1232 (D. Nev. 1999)).
[Vol. 28:163
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in the entire Basin for 32 months, and on sensitive lands in Nevada... for
eight months. 3 2 The moratoria imposed by Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution
83-21 were the regulations challenged as takings in Tahoe-Sierra.3
B. Procedural History
Land owners brought suit both individually and through the Tahoe
Sierra Preservation Council, which represented about two thousand owners
of improved or unimproved property in the Lake Tahoe Basin.34 The litigation
was quite extensive. The Supreme Court noted that it "produced four
opinions by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and several published
District Court opinions." 5
The district court recognized the petitioner's regulatory takings claims,
and cited Agins for the proposition that a "[g]overnment regulation will
constitute a taking when either: (1) it does not substantially advance a
legitimate state interest; or (2) it denies the owner economically viable use of
her land."3 6 The court first held the moratoria were legitimate, based upon the
natural beauty of the lake and the tourism industry it generated. 7 It also found
the moratoria substantially advanced that state interest by being proportional
enough to the problem intended to be addressed. Indeed, the court found it
"difficult to see how a more proportional response could have been
adopted. 38
The district court then considered whether the moratoria denied the
plaintiffs economically viable use of their property. To make that deter-
mination, the court addressed the key question of whether the moratoria
32 Id. at 312.
3 I1d. at 306.
34 Id.
" Id. at 313 (prior opinions include 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding the temporary
moratorium did not amount to a taking); 34 F.3d 753 (9th Cir. 1994) (resolving issues
regarding the date the claim accrued, relation back and statute of limitations issues); 938 F.2d
153 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding agency was not immune, claims were not mooted by regional
plan, and the claims were ripe); 808 F. Supp. 1474 (D. Nev. 1992) (holding claims to be
barred by the statute of limitations); 808 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Nev. 1992) (holding claim to be
barred by the statute of limitations); 911 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding certain claims
unripe, the regional planning agency was not immune from liability, and property owners had
claim for reimbursement independent of the taking of the land itself); 611 F. Supp. 110 (D.
Nev. 1985) (resolving immunity and condemnation authority issues).
36 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1239.
37 Id.
3 Id. at 1240.
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denied the plaintiff's total economic use or only partial economic use, and
analyzed the facts under both theories.39
When determining whether a regulatory taking exists, courts look to
"essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[ies]" regarding "(1) 'the economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant'; (2) 'the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct, investment-backed expectations'; and (3) 'the
character of the governmental action."' 40 The district court found weighing
the Penn Central factors "clearly leads to the conclusion that there was no
taking.' 1 The first factor weighed in favor of the regulation because the
plaintiffs offered no evidence of the economic impact of the regulation on
their property values.4" The second factor was undermined by the temporary
nature of the moratoria, which did not interfere with lot owners' reasonable
expectation of development when the average lot owner held the lot
undeveloped for twenty-five years.43 The court determined the third factor
was in favor of the regulation because it was a "direct and reasonable"
method of combating the degradation of Lake Tahoe's clarity while the
property owners retained property rights such as the right to exclude.' The
court held no taking occurred under a Penn Central analysis as all three
factors weighed against a taking, and the plaintiffs could only recover if the
regulation denied all economically viable use of their property.45
The District Court analyzed the takings claim under Lucas to determine
if the moratoria fit within its categorical rule that "[a] statute regulating the
uses that can be made of property effects a taking if it 'denies an owner
economically viable use of his land."4 6 The court found both Ordinance 81-5
and Resolution 83-21 denied the plaintiffs economically viable use of their
property; Ordinance 81-5 because it was "highly doubtful that any of [the
391 Id. at 1240-41.
40 Id. at 1240 (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, at 124
1978)).
Id.42 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226,
1240 (D. Nev. 1999).
41 Id. at 1240.
44 Id. at 1241.451d. at 1241-42.
46 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.6 (1992) (quoting Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987) (quoting Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 295,295-96 (1981) (quoting Agins,
447 U.S. at 260))).
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allowed] uses could ever be considered economically viable,"'47 and
Resolution 83-21 because "uses were even more restricted." 8 Weighing into
that decision was the Ninth Circuit's requirement that an economically viable
use of property exists "when a competitive market exists for the property.' 9
Despite the properties in question retaining some value, the lack of evidence
showing a competitive market for the regulated properties allowed the court
to find a categorical regulatory taking.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's finding of a categorical
taking but affirmed the district court's Penn Central balance, which held the
regulations did not effect a taking." The Supreme Court granted a limited
writ of certiorari to claims of a temporary regulatory taking by the Ordinance
81-5 two-year moratorium, and the Ordinance 83-21 eight-month morator-
ium."1 Chief Justice William Rehnquist dissented, insisting that the proper
time period was 1981 through 1987. This included the moratoria plus a
district court's injunction, which for three years prohibited the implemen-
tation of a development plan that would violate TRPA regulations and the
1980 Tahoe Regional Planning Compact.52 Despite Rehnquist's argument
that the Court "relie[d] on the flawed determination of the Court of Appeals
that the relevant time period lasted only from August 1981 until April
1984, ' 5 the Court clearly granted certiorari on the narrow question of:
"Whether the Court of Appeals properly determined that a temporary
moratorium on land development does not constitute a taking of property
requiring compensation under the Takings Clause of the United States
Constitution. 5
4
4" Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1243.
48 Id. at 1245.
491 d. at 1243 (citing Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422,
1433 (9th Cir. 1996)).
5 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 782
(9th Cir. 2000).
, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 313
2002).
2 Id. at 346 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
" Id. at 344 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 533 U.S. 948, 948-49(200 1) (granting certiorari) (emphasis added). Rehnquist would have included the time ofthe
temporary restraining order and permanent injunction that the district court imposed until
1987 as "[t]he question of how long the moratorium on land development lasted is
necessarily subsumed within the question whether the moratorium constituted a taking."
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 343 n. 1 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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C. Tahoe-Sierra's Place in Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court has established a divergence in takings juris-
prudence between physical invasions and regulations which may effect a
taking, and held that it would be "inappropriate to treat cases involving
physical takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a claim that
there has been a 'regulatory taking,' and vice versa."55 A preliminary finding
of ripeness must be found before the Court will address a regulatory takings
claim. 6 This section will identify the primary characteristics of that
requirement through three representative cases. This section will also de-
scribe the major decisions in regulatory takings jurisprudence that led up to
the Tahoe-Sierra decision. The importance of "essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries"" has been central to regulatory takings jurisprudence in contrast
to the "for the most part ... straightforward application of per se rules""
used in physical appropriation takings jurisprudence.59
1. Ripeness
a. Final Decision Requirement
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank,60 the Court held that "[b]ecause respondent has not yet obtained a final
decision regarding the application of. . . regulations to its property, nor
utilized the procedures Tennessee provides for obtaining just compensation,
respondent's claim is not ripe."'" The Court noted that until a claim ripens,
analyzing the Penn Central factors would create uncertainty as to the true
nature of the claim.6
5 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 323.
56 See infra Part III.C. 1.
7 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, at 124 (1978).
s Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 322.
59 Id.
60 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
61 Id. at 186.
62 Id. at 191 ("Those factors simply cannot be evaluated until the administrative agency has
arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to
the particular land in question.").
174 [Vol. 28:163
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b. Permit Denial is Required for Ripeness
In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. ,63 the Court held that
a permit requirement alone "does not itself 'take' the property in any sense"
by intrinsically allowing for the possibility of a permit being granted, and
stated that "[o]nly when a permit is denied and the effect of the denial is to
prevent 'economically viable' use of the land in question can it be said that
a taking has occurred." ' The Court held that ripeness resulting from the
denial of a permit was a threshold issue to allow a property owner to claim
a regulatory taking.65
c. Permit Delays May Result in Ripeness
In Wyatt v. United States, 6 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit addressed the often "complex regulatory permitting schemes"
which may cause extensive delays in the permitting process.67 The court held
"that a taking may occur by reason of 'extraordinary delay in governmental
decisionmaking,"' but that it would be a "rare circumstance that [the court]
will find a taking based on extraordinary delay without a showing of bad
faith."6 The combination of Riverside Bayview Homes and Wyatt allows for
ripeness, through either the denial of a permit or through an extraordinary
delay in the decision-making process. To satisfy the Williamson requirement,
that some final decision regarding the application of a regulation prior to the
adjudication of a regulatory takings claim, one of these must occur.
2. Regulatory Takings: "[E]ssentially [A]d [H]oc, [Flactual
[I]nquiries"'69
a. Establishing Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon7" the Supreme Court held "that
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far
63474 U.S. 121 (1985).
64d. at 127.
65 Id.
66271 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
67 Id. at 1098.
6 8 
id.
69 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
70 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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it will be recognized as a taking."'" Justice Holmes recognized the difficulty
of creating firm and fast rules for regulations which inherently affect
individual property owners in varying degrees. The opinion stated that
regulatory takings claims are "a question of degree-and therefore cannot
be disposed of by general propositions."72 Mahon, however, created more
questions than it answered.7 3
b. The Heart of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence
In order for a court to analyze a regulatory takings claim, it must know
the proper parcel of property that was affected by the regulation. Property law
has typically been described as a "bundle of rights." Although commentators
have criticized the appropriateness of the metaphor, it remains the dominant
model.74 In Penn Central Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, noted that
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in
a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding
whether a particular governmental action has effected a
taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the
action and on the nature and extent of the interference with
rights in the parcel as a whole.. .7
The Court held in Andrus v. Allard76 that "where an owner possesses a full
'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not
a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety."77 In recent
years, however, the appropriate property denominator for a takings claim has
71 Id. at 415.72 1d. at 416.
73 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 163-66 (1977).7 4 See, e.g., Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle ofSticks: Land as a Community-Based
Resource, 32 ENVTL. L. 773 (2002) (acknowledging the usefulness of the "bundle of rights"
as a teaching tool, but arguing it is incompatible with ecology and concluding a community-
based resource metaphor better serves the modem understanding of property rights); J.E.
Penner, The "Bundle ofRights "Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711 (1996) (arguing
the term "bundle of rights" is a dominant method of understanding property rights for
academics, practitioners and students but truly represents the absence of a clear theory of
property).
7Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
76 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
77 Id. at 65-66.
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been questioned.7" The Supreme Court has also recently moved to protect
property owners from government regulation under the Clean Water Act79
and to limit what the Court sees as unwarranted federal regulation exercised
under the Commerce Clause invading traditional state rights.80 It is possible
that members of the Court supporting these movements would attempt to
limit federal power in the takings context as well. In Tahoe-Sierra, Justice
John Paul Stevens demonstrated how precedent had shown that one stick in
the bundle could be destroyed without the action being regarded as a taking.8 '
Rehnquist however, joined by Scalia and Thomas in dissent, at the very least
disagreed with the majority that the temporal right must be treated as a
whole, 2 while Thomas in a separate dissent continued to question the appro-
priateness of the parcel as a whole rule. 3 The current Court affirmed the
parcel as a whole rule by a 6-3 majority and mandated its application for
lower courts.8 4
In Penn Central, the Supreme Court identified a set of criteria by which
regulatory takings claims should be analyzed. First, the Court identified two
7
' Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-17 n.7 (1992) ("uncertainty regarding
the composition of the denominator in our 'deprivation' fraction has produced inconsistent
pronouncements by the Court"); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001)
(noting some cases support the parcel as a whole rule "but [the court] ha[s] at times expressed
discomfort with the logic of th[e] rule").
" See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 159 (2001) (holding the Army Corps' assertion ofjurisdiction over
intrastate waters used as habitat for migratory birds exceeded the authority granted to the
Army Corps by the Clean Water Act).
" See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating provisions of
the Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
(invalidating a federal gun control statute enacted under the Commerce Clause); Jesse H.
Choper, Taming Congress's Power Under the Commerce Clause: What Does the Near
Future Portend?, 55 ARK. L. REv. 731 (2003) (discussing Supreme Court's attempt to limit
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause).
s" Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327
(2002) (citing Keystone Butuminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470 at 498
(1987) (requiring coal pillars be left in place is not a taking); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.
51,66 (1999) (regulation on commercial transactions in eagle feathers was not a taking when
other uses were allowed); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927) (setback ordinances are not
a taking)).
82 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 553 U.S. at 346-47 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting no
distinction exists between temporary and permanent takings).
83 Id. at 355 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (the parcel as a whole rule was "questionable" and was
"rejected in the context of temporal deprivations of property").
s4 Id. at 331 ("Petitioners' 'conceptual severance' argument is unavailing because it ignores
Penn Central's admonition that in regulatory takings cases we must focus on 'the parcel as
a whole."' (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31
(1978))).
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factors: "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations" as criteria." The other primary criterion was
the "character of the governmental action,"8 6 because the Court recognized
that regulations were capable of affecting property owners in a spectrum of
ways, from regulations analogous to a physical appropriation to regulations
which merely "[adjust] the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote
the common good."87 The Court went on to explain how it determined those
factors were the foundation of regulatory takings decision making.88
Penn Central identified the economic impact of a regulation as a re-
levant criterion of a takings claim.89 The Court recognized the obvious in-
stances where aper se rule outlawing any negative economic impact would
effect a taking, such as taxes. It also noted that to government "if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law," government would be crippled."° The
Court recognized the pragmatic value of allowing regulations to negatively
affect economic interests as was inevitable from any significant amount of
governmental regulation.9 The Court also recognized that governmental
regulation can go too far by creating a test that will force the government to
pay for regulations "which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole."92
The Court recognized that regulations which interfere with distinct
investment-backed expectations should be a criterion based upon the Mahon
decision.93 When a property owner invested in a property with expectations
of development, and a regulation was promulgated which frustrated that
expectation, the regulation "had nearly the same effect as the complete
destruction of rights claimant had reserved." '94
" Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
86 Id.
87 Id.
99 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, at 413 (1992)).
"' Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.92 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
" See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (citing Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)); see also
Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 40 (1960); Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
94 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127.
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The character of the governmental action was the final criterion the
Court identified." This criterion essentially requires courts to analogize
governmental action to either a physical invasion or a regulation under the
state's police power. The Court must then determine the action's level of
destructive power along a spectrum to determine how the character of the
governmental action should weigh in the balancing determination.96 Govern-
mental action that, although not continuous, essentially invaded the property
was analogous to a physical taking.97 Zoning laws exemplify the opposite end
of the spectrum of governmental regulations, which are clearly within the
police power of the state.
98
Thus, the factors which determine whether a taking has occurred are the
balance of the economic impact on the property owner, the regulation's
interference with the property owner's distinct investment-backed expect-
ations, and the character of the governmental action.
c. Alternate Factors Used in Regulatory Takings Cases
The Agins decision upheld California zoning regulations while iden-
tifying a two-pronged standard for regulatory takings jurisprudence. 99 The
Court weighed private and public interests to determine whether zoning
advanced a legitimate state interest, and found that it did.'1° The zoning
allowed the construction of five homes on the five acre parcel in question and
the Court determined that while development was limited, the property
owners' "reasonable investment expectations" were not unconstitutionally
91 Id. at 124.
' See id. at 124-28.
9' See id. at 128 (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (aircraft overflights
constituted a taking); Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922) (government
firing of weapons over property constituted a taking); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316
(1917) (repeated flooding constituted a taking)).8 See id. at 125 (citing Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603,608 (1927) ("requirement that portions
of parcels be left unbuilt"); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) ("prohibition
of industrial use"); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) ("height restriction")). But see
Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (holding zoning ordinance invalid).
99 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980) (holding "[t]he application of a general
zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests" "or denies an owner economically viable use of his land"
(citing Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928), Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138, n.36 (1978))).
"o Agins, 442 U.S. at 261.
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infringed upon.' The Court used a balancing test, but did not explicitly
apply the factors laid out in Penn Central.
d. Remedies are Available for Temporary Takings
The Court addressed temporary takings in First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, California'0 2 in the
context of compensation. The lower court had determined that a temporary
taking had occurred, and the Court limited the scope of its decision to
compensation by leaving any questions as to the occurrence of a taking "open
for decision on the [directed] remand."'0 3
In his Tahoe-Sierra dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited his majority
opinion in First English as rejecting "any distinction between temporary
and permanent takings when a landowner is deprived of all economically
beneficial use of his land," 104 noting that "'temporary takings which, as
here, deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind
from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires
compensation. "105
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Tahoe-Sierra, pointed out
that "[i]n First English, the Court unambiguously and repeatedly char-
acterized the issue to be decided as a 'compensation question' or a 'remedial
question. ' ' ' 116 First English did not decide the "logically prior question
whether the temporary regulation at issue had in fact constituted a taking"
which was the question to be decided in Tahoe-Sierra.'0 7 Despite the Chief
Justice's argument in his Tahoe-Sierra dissent, First English clearly was
limited to compensation for a temporary taking, and expressly denied any
determination of how to identify when a temporary taking has occurred.
101 Id. at 262.
102 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
"03 Id. at 313.
'04 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency 535 U.S. 302, 347
(2002).
'o' Id. at 347-48 (quoting First English, 482 U.S. at 318).
106 Id. at 328 (quoting First English, 482 U.S. at 311).
107 Id.
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e. The Exception that Proves the Rule
The Lucas opinion was the most significant regulatory takings opinion
since Penn Central, because instead of finding a taking based upon a
balancing of private and public interests, it created a per se rule "that when
the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good . . . he has suffered a
taking."' ' The Court based the bright line exception for denials of all
economically beneficial use on the second prong ofAgins. 09 This categorical
compensation requirement was the blueprint for the petition in Tahoe-Sierra
asking the Court to create another categorical exception for takings which
temporarily denied all economically beneficial use." "
The Court in Tahoe-Sierra rejected the proposed new categorical rule
in the mold of Lucas and reaffirmed the Penn Central balancing test as the
crux of regulatory takings jurisprudence."' The Court worried about the
effect a categorical rule for temporary permanent deprivations of economic
use would have on traditional governmental actions." 2 Such a rule would
conflict with the basic admonition by Justice Holmes that "[g]ovemment
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law...... The
fundamental question was how the Court should determine if a regulation
falls within the police powers of the state, or whether the property was
imposed upon so greatly that it was "taken" for a public use. The Court has
always focused upon fairness and justice in takings jurisprudence in an
'0' Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (emphasis in original).
" Id. at 1015-16; see Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,261 (1980) ("The application
of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance ... denies an
owner economically viable use of his land."); see also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978).
"0 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 318.
"'I d. at 342.
112 Id. at 334-42 (stating that the categorical rule would affect "'normal delays in obtaining
building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances,' . . . orders temporarily
prohibiting access to crime scenes, businesses that violate health codes, fire-damaged
buildings, or other areas that we cannot now foresee" (quoting First English v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987))).
113 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
2003]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
attempt to insure that no one person would be forced to bear "public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole."' 14
f. Setting the Stage for Tahoe-Sierra
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island"5 was the Supreme Court's final opinion
prior to Tahoe-Sierra that addressed regulatory takings. The Court held that
a property owner, who acquired the regulated property after the regulation
was imposed, retained standing to bring a takings claim based on the pre-
purchase regulations." 6
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, noted that when a regulation
denied an owner all economically beneficial use of his land, Lucas'
categorical rule requiring compensation applied, otherwise the multi-factored
balancing test from Penn Central determined if a taking had occurred. "' The
Court noted that the determination of whether a taking had occurred should
be conducted bearing in mind "the purpose of the Takings Clause, which is
to prevent the government from 'forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.""'"
The opinion found that the ripeness requirement had been met by the
denial of the property owner's permit, and affirmed the ripeness principle that
"[w]here the state agency charged with enforcing a challenged land-use
regulation entertains an application from an owner [and its denial of the
application] makes clear the extent of development permitted" the issue was
ripe, and no further futile applications were needed." 9
Justice Kennedy briefly addressed the parcel as a whole doctrine, but the
issue of the proper denominator was not raised in the state courts, so the
Court refused to consider it.'2' The Court did note that the issue involved
a "difficult, persisting question of what is the proper denominator in the
"t' Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
115 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
116 Id. at 616.
" Id. at 617.
I8 ld. at 617-18 (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49).
119 Id. at 625-26.
120Id. at 630-31.
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takings fraction,"'' thereby setting the stage for the Court to address the rule
in Tahoe-Sierra.
IV. TAHOE-SIERRA'S IMPORTANCE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND USE
POLICY
The Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra gave guidance to lower courts
which will greatly benefit environmental and land use planning, but left the
lower courts to continue to apply the Court's unclear regulatory takings
jurisprudence. The primary effect Tahoe-Sierra has had on lower courts is the
affirmation of the parcel as a whole doctrine. This section will show how
necessary environmental regulations and traditional land-use devices were
protected by the Tahoe-Sierra opinion through lower courts interpreting the
decision. Interestingly, had the dissenters in Tahoe-Sierra prevailed, and a
new categorical rule allowing the recovery of damages based upon a tem-
porary deprivation of all economically beneficial use been created. Otherwise,
many environmental regulations may have created a taking which the gov-
ernment would be forced to pay for, which could have caused the end of
environmental regulation as it now exists. The extent to which government
regulations would create a taking under the proposed categorical rule would
potentially violate Justice Holmes' admonition that "[g]overnment hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law."' 22
Environmental and land use planners won a victory in Tahoe-Sierra, but
subsequent lower court decisions make it clear that the decision did not
definitively address the convoluted nature ofregulatory takingsjurisprudence.
A. The Importance of Tahoe-Sierra's Affirmation of the Parcel as a
Whole Rule as Applied to Wetlands Regulation
1. Facts
Walcek v. United States'23 involves property owners' regulatory takings
challenge to the Army Corps ofEngineers' ("Corps") denial of a permit under
121 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001).
'2 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
1 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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the Clean Water Act to develop the federal wetlands located on their
property. 124 The decision demonstrates how a differently decided Tahoe-
Sierra could have crippled wetland regulations. In 1971, the Walceks pur-
chased a 14.5 acre parcel, of which 13.2 acres were wetlands, and 11 acres on
which development was prohibited. 125 The wetlands located on the property
became subject to the 1972 Clean Water Act permit requirements after the
purchase of the parcel. 126 In 1984, in an attempt to sell the parcel to a
developer, the Corps, at Walcek's request, delineated the exact contours of
the 13.2 acres of regulated wetlands. 27 By that time, the development deal
had fallen through. 28 Consequently, in 1987 the Walceks began to develop
the property themselves for residential purposes by filling the regulated
wetlands.129 Eventually, the Walceks complied with a cease and desist order
from the Corps and filed for the necessary permits in 1988, which were
denied. 30
After the Walceks filed a complaint in the Court of Federal Claims in
1996 challenging the Corps permit denial, the Corps approved a permit for
a 28 lot development which allowed filling 2.2 acres of wetlands but was
contingent upon restoring or creating 4.4 acres of wetlands.' 3' The Walceks
challenged the permit as a taking, claiming the relevant parcel was the 13.2
acres of regulated wetlands.3 2 The court held that the relevant parcel was
14.5 acres and there was no categorical taking, as 2.2 acres were allowed to
be developed. 33 The court found that there was no regulatory taking either
under the Penn Central factors because the plaintiffs were able to realize
much of their reasonable expectations in the property. 34 The Walceks
appealed.
124 Id. at 1349.125 Id. at 1351-54.
1261Id. at 1351.
127 Id. at 1352.128 Id.
129 Walcek, 303 F.3d at 1352.
130 Id. at 1352-53.
131 Id. at 1353.
132 1d.
'3 Id. at 1353-54.
13 4 Id. at 1354.
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2. Parcel as a Whole Determination
The Walceks challenged the trial court's Penn Central balance for its
determination that the 14.5 acre parcel was the relevant parcel for analysis.1
35
Citing Tahoe-Sierra, the Court of Appeals held the parcel as a whole must be
the parcel addressed in a regulatory takings claim. 36 The court noted "the
Court reaffirmed that regulatory takings analysis properly analyzes the impact
of the challenged regulation on the land owner's entire parcel.' 3' The court
approvingly cited from the Tahoe-Sierra opinion, and recognized that "[w] ith
property so divided, every delay would become a total ban; the moratorium
and the normal permit process alike would constitute categorical takings.'1
3
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that the relevant parcel
was the 14.5 acre parcel as a whole. 139
3. The Parcel as a Whole Rule is Absolutely Vital to Continued
Wetlands Regulation
The significance of a strong parcel as a whole doctrine is undeniable in
the face of wetlands regulation. Without the parcel as a whole rule, land-
owners simply would be able to divide their holdings into separate parcels,
some constituting the exact boundaries of the regulated wetlands and others
the unregulated property. Each newly created parcel either would not be
subject to regulation, or would be completely regulated and a taking would
result, even if the regulated wetlands constituted a low percentage of the
original contiguous parcel. Allowing the division of property into smaller
divisions would create a situation where every wetland regulation would
be a taking. During the 1980s, the United States had a surface area of
2,313,617,280 acres, 274,426,114 (11.9%) of which was wetlands.' 4 That
represents a thirty percent decline since the 1780s.' 4' If the parcel as a whole
doctrine were abandoned or modified to regard the relevant parcel as the
i3' Walcek, 303 F.3d at 1354.
136 Id. at 1356.
137 Id.
138 Id.
,
39 id. at 1357.
14o THOMAS E. DAHL, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR WETLANDS LOsSES IN THE UNITED STATES
1780S TO 1980s, Table 1 (1990), available at http://www.npwrc.usgs.gov/resource/othrdata/
wetloss/wetloss.htm.
141 Id.
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regulated parcel, the cost of wetland and other property regulations would be
prohibitive, and accordingly the decline of wetlands would accelerate.'42 Even
if the value of wetlands were set at a mere one hundred dollars per acre,
regulating wetlands would cost the United States over twenty-seven billion
dollars in takings claims. 4 ' Finding funding for such high costs would be
nearly impossible both financially and politically. Tahoe-Sierra 's clear up-
holding of the parcel as a whole doctrine has undeniable importance for a
continuing future of wetlands regulation, and a different outcome in Tahoe-
Sierra would have collapsed the federal wetlands regulatory scheme as it now
exists.
B. Following the Leader I: Tahoe-Sierra's Guidance with the Parcel as
a Whole Doctrine and Penn Central Analysis
In Machipongo Land and Coal Co. v. Commonwealth'" the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court addressed a takings claim based on environmental
protections from the mining industry. The federal government mandated that
states designate certain areas as unfit for mining for the purpose of protecting
the environment.145
1. Parcel as a Whole is the Rule: What Exactly does it Mean?
Machipongo initially analyzed the proper denominator for the takings
claim, and while recognizing that Tahoe-Sierra had reaffirmed the parcel as
a whole doctrine, the opinion remanded the case for a determination of the
appropriate parcel based upon a series of factors.146 The court noted that
142 Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324
(holding that treating all land-use regulations "asperse takings would transform government
regulation into a luxury few governments could afford").
143 -DAHL, supra note 140 (explaining that there were 274,426,114 acres of wetlands in the
Unites States as of the 1980s).
'44 799 A.2d 751 (Pa. 2002).14- See 30 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (2000).
146 Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 799 A.2d 751, 768-69 (Pa. 2002).
The factors used in determining the relevant parcel
would include, but would not be limited to: unity and contiguity of
ownership, the dates of acquisition, the extent to which the proposed
parcel has been treated as a single unit, the extent to which the regulated
holding benefits the unregulated holdings; the timing of transfers, if any,
in light of the developing regulatory environment; the owner's investment
backed-expectations; and, the landowner's plans for development.
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claimants had previously attempted to divide a parcel horizontally, vertically,
and temporally. '47 Although the court was able to cite to Tahoe-Sierra for the
temporal severance and Penn Central for vertical severance, for horizontal
severance the court resorted to a lesser authority by citing to the Second
Circuit."4 The term "parcel as a whole" is not self-defining and Machipongo
reflected how the Supreme Court, although clearly placing the parcel as a
whole as the appropriate denominator,'49 had yet to clearly establish for lower
courts what geographic boundaries and legal rights created a parcel as a
whole. Although lower courts are clearly capable of creating tests to de-
termine the appropriate horizontal parcel, the extensive federal regulation
which results in regulatory takings claims and the Supreme Court's duty as
the final arbiter of the Constitution requires the Supreme Court to establish
a national standard for clarifying the appropriate legal dimensions of a parcel.
2. The Penn Central Factors Must be Applied
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion reflected the Supreme Court's
attempt to install Penn Central as the primary regulatory takings test, subject
only to the Lucas exception. The court conceptualized regulatory takings
jurisprudence as initially a question of whether the Lucas exception applies,
while Penn Central "becomes applicable if the regulation does not rise to
the level of a Lucas taking."'5 ° The court held the regulation applied to
Machipongo failed to meet the Lucas exception, and that the lower court
failed to fully analyze the Penn Central factors.' 5' The importance of Tahoe-
Sierra was reflected when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded for a
Penn Central analysis without addressing the multitude of factors that has
become the trademark of regulatory takings jurisprudence. Justice Stevens'
opinion in Tahoe-Sierra establishing Penn Central as the sole test for regula-
tory takings claims only achieved its' goals if lower courts acknowledge the
Supreme Court's direction and follow it. Although the Machipongo court did
reflect the Supreme Court's move to establish Penn Central as the sole test
Id. (citing Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
,47 Id. at 766.
148 Id.
149 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327
2002) ("in [regulatory takings] cases we must focus on 'the parcel as a whole').
oMachipongo, 799 A.2d at 765.
's1 Id. at 770-71.
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for a regulatory takings claims, other lower court cases established that
Tahoe-Sierra 's direction was not as clear as Machipongo would make it
seem.
C. Following the Leader I. Was Tahoe-Sierra's Guidance Clear?
1. Facts
Seiber v. United States5 ' was a permanent takings challenge of Oregon
Department of Forestry regulations designed to protect spotted owl habitat.
The plight of the spotted owl and the movement supporting the preservation
of spotted owl habitat has been well documented. 1 3 Forty acres of the
Seibers' 185 to 190 acres of commercial timber property, located within the
200 acre contiguous parcel the Seibers owned, was deemed spotted owl
habitat and an incidental take permit was required to log the forty acres.'54
Subsequent to the filing of the suit, the permit requirement was dropped for
the forty acres, and plaintiffs asserted a temporary takings claim rather than
a permanent takings claim.'
Initially the Seiber court determined that the takings claim was not ripe
under Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States 56 and Williamson, '57 as no final
decision had been reached by the Fish and Wildlife Service.'58 Despite that
determination the court decided to address the merits of the takings claim.
... 53 Fed. Cl. 570 (2002).
"' See, e.g., Peter J. Gardner, Owl Redux, 28 VT. B.J. 33 (2002). The Fish & Wildlife
Service maintains a site for the spotted owl containing information and a historic news
releases database at http://endangered.fws.gov/i/B6K.htm (last modified Oct. 11, 2000).
"
4 Seiber, 53 Fed. Cl. at 572 n. 1. The incidental take permit requirements are as follows:
Under the Endangered Species Act, the "take" of an endangered species
is prohibited unless authorized by regulation or permit. 16 U.S.C. §
1538(a)(1)(B). "Take" is defined under the Endangered Species Act as
"harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect,
or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
"Harm" in the definition of 'take' means any act which actually kills or
injures protected wildlife and "may include significant habitat mod-
ification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding,
feeding or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3.
Seiber, 53 Fed. Cl. at 572 n. 1.
'"Id. at 573-74.
156296 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
157 473 U.S. 172 (1985); see supra Part III C.l.a. and accompanying notes.
"' Seiber, 53 Fed. Cl. at 575.
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The court held the plaintiffs failed to meet either the physical invasion
takings test,159 or the Lucas exception. 6'
2. Settling on the Relevant Factors for Regulatory Takings Analysis
The Seiber court then began to analyze the temporary takings claim
under a myriad of rules. The court identified relevant factors including the
two-prong test from Agins, the three factors from Penn Central, and the
length of delay in granting a permit from the ripeness decision Wyatt. 6' The
court noted that the Supreme Court had been unclear as to the factors to be
weighed in a balancing test, but acknowledged that Tahoe-Sierra had
determined "that regardless of the relevant factors, the parcel must be focused
on as a whole."' 62 After the Seiber court resolved a balancing test--consisting
of the factors it deemed relevant, as discussed above-in favor of the
government regulation,'63 it conducted another balancing test based solely on
the Penn Central factors.64
The Seiber court dealt rapidly with the Penn Central analysis to find
against the plaintiffs. 65 The fact that the permit requirement was lifted en-
sured that the plaintiffs would be able to realize their investment-backed
expectations, and although they suffered some adverse economic impact,
after the permit was denied they were able to log and profit from the rest of
the parcel. 66 The court determined the permit requirement did not single the
plaintiffs out as several properties have come within the plan's restrictions. 67
The character of the government's actions weighed in favor of the govem-
ment.
I59 ld. at 576 ("Plaintiffs, therefore, have failed to state a permanent physical taking claim.").
'Id. at 577 ("Thus, because the 40 acres alleged to be taken were not 100% of the timber
interest, and therefore, plaintiffs' land did not lose all economically viable or beneficial use
of that interest, plaintiffs' Lucas claim fails.").
161 Id. at 578.
162 Id. at 577 ("What [the balancing test] entails has not been delineated by the Supreme
Court, but the Court has stated that regardless of the relevant factors, the parcel must be
focused on as a whole.").
163 Id. at 579 ('This Court finds that the permit process in this case did not constitute a
temporary taking of plaintiffs' property.").
M6 Seiber, 53 Fed. Cl. at 579.
165 Id. at 579-80.
'66 Id. at 579.
167Id. at 580.
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The Seiber decision clearly demonstrated the difficulties inherent in
regulatory takings jurisprudence. The court recognized that ripeness issues in
takings claims seem to be capable of being dealt with within the context of
a balancing test.168 The lack of clarity inherent in regulatory takings was
demonstrated by the court's analysis of the temporary takings claim under a
veritable smorgasbord of factors'69 only five months after the Supreme Court
in Tahoe-Sierra held that "the interest in 'fairness and justice' will be best
served by relying on the familiar Penn Central approach when deciding"
regulatory takings claims. 7 °
3. Expressly Establishing the Penn Central Factors for Analysis of
Regulatory Takings Claims
The Seiber court's initial analysis under the six factors could have been
adequately dealt with by Penn Central's three factors and still have addressed
the concerns reflected in the six-factor analysis. The court analyzed the
plaintiffs claims that a taking had occurred when timber prices declined
during the logging restriction under Tahoe-Sierra and Agins. 17 The court
held that the temporary nature of the restriction avoid a taking based on
Tahoe-Sierra,1 because the fluctuation in timber value is something in-
cidental to ownership that did not constitute a taking under Agins.'73
The concerns reflected in the six-factor analysis are directly in
accordance with the concerns reflected in the Penn Central factor of
economic impact on the plaintiff. The Seiber court held that because a permit
16' Id. at 578 (using a ripeness case as a factor in the balancing test despite finding that the
plaintiff's claim was unripe).
"
9 Id. (explaining six factors in alleged regulatory takings: (1)"substantially advanc[ing] a
legitimate government interest," (2) "den[ying] an owner economically viable use of his
land," (3) "the economic impact of the regulation on the property owners," (4) "the extent
to which the regulation has interfered with the property owners' investment-backed
expectations," (5) "the character of the government action," 6) "the length of delay in the
regulatory process").
7O-Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 342
(2002).
Seiber, 53 Fed. Cl. at 578.
'
72 Id. ("A temporary restriction that merely causes a diminution in value does not constitute
a taking of the 'parcel as a whole."').
173 Id. ("Mere fluctuations in value during the process of governmental decisionmaking,
absent extraordinary delay, are 'incidents of ownership. They cannot be considered as a
'taking' in the constitutional sense."' (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225, 263
n.9 (1980))).
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was no longer required, logging could provide the Seibers with economic
gains and because the plaintiffs had been able to log and profit from portions
of their property during the regulation, the economic impact on them was not
especially great.'74 The economic concerns reflected by the court's analysis
under the six-factor analysis were dealt with adequately by the court under
the Penn Central analysis. The logical conclusion would be that one or more
of the factors was unnecessary for the resolution of the takings claim. The
court's six-factor analysis addressed the plaintiffs' arguments that the
regulation was improper governmental action. The first allegation was that
the government regulation violated the Agins requirement that regulations
substantially advance a legitimate governmental interest. 75 The court noted
the plaintiffs' argument that the preservation interest was not "'sufficient to
cause' the government to designate private lands as critical habitat" which
was not what Agins required. 76 The second allegation by the plaintiffs
challenged that the delay in denying or granting the permit amounted to a
taking. The court held that the ripeness doctrine required a taking by delay to
be the result of an "extraordinary delay" or bad faith on the part of the
government. 77 Without such a showing, the plaintiffs' takings claim based
on delay failed.
The six-factor analysis demonstrated that the governmental action was
not arbitrary or done in a wrongful manner. Those concerns are addressed
by the Penn Central factor requiring an analysis of the character of the
governmental action. The Seiber court analyzed the plaintiffs' claim that the
regulation violated Penn Central by singling them out to bear a public
burden, and determined that the Endangered Species Act regulations did not
single the plaintiffs out. 171 In a claim based solely upon Penn Central, the
character of the governmental action factor must incorporate allegations that
the government acted in bad faith, or acted in a manner that did not advance
any legitimate state interest.
Seiber demonstrated both the importance of Tahoe-Sierra 's affirmation
of the parcel as a whole doctrine and the failure--despite Justice Stevens'
174 Id. at 579 (stating that'[p]laintiffs are now in a position to log the timber for an economic
gain" and "[t]hey have been logging and deriving income from other portions of their
property all along").75 Id. at 578.
176 Id.
177 Seiber, 53 Fed. Cl. at 578-79.
178 Id. at 579-80.
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approval of Penn Central-to clearly direct lower courts to analyze regulatory
takings claims under Penn Central.
D. Following the Leader II" Tahoe-Sierra's Guidance was Clear After
All
1. Facts
The Court of Federal Claims decision in Bass Enterprises Production
Co. v. United States79 demonstrates the future direction of regulatory takings
claims by application of Justice Stevens' Tahoe-Sierra dicta, which should
be replicated throughout lower courts with the proper guidance from the
Supreme Court. Bass Enterprises applied for permits to drill for oil and gas
on land designated for nuclear waste disposal and experienced significant
delays due to the sensitive nature of ensuring safe nuclear waste disposal. 80
Prior to the Tahoe-Sierra decision, the court found that the permit granting
delay for Bass Enterprises' gas and oil leases denied it all economically
beneficial use of its leases based on a per se temporary regulatory takings test
formulated from Lucas.'8' Following the Tahoe-Sierra decision, the court
granted the government's motion for reconsideration to determine how
Tahoe-Sierra affected the court's prior decision82 The court recognized
Tahoe-Sierra 's obvious application to the facts in Bass Enterprises and held
the categorical rule it had imposed was improper and that a balancing of the
Penn Central factors should govern Bass Enterprises."3
2. Penn Central: Past and the Future of Regulatory Takings
The importance of the Bass Enterprises decision was not that it applied
Tahoe-Sierra correctly and recognized the repudiation of a per se rule for
temporary takings, but rather that it applied only the three Penn Central
factors in its subsequent analysis to determine if a taking had occurred.
Although Justice Stevens wrote in dicta that Penn Central was the appro-
priate test for regulatory takings claims, it was not explicit enough direction
' 54 Fed. C1. 400 (2002).
"
0 Id. at 401.
",Id. at 401-02.
"
2 Id. at 402.
183 id.
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for some courts to disregard the myriad of other factors utilized throughout
regulatory takings cases.l8 Bass Enterprises recognized the recent trend of
the Supreme Court, with Justice Stevens' explicit recommendation in Tahoe-
Sierra, to address the balancing act of private versus public interests exclu-
sively in the terms of the Penn Central factors." 5
a. Character of the Governmental Action
The Bass Enterprises application of the Penn Central factors demon-
strated how those three factors were fully capable of addressing the concerns
reflected in other regulatory takings cases. Under the character of govem-
mental action, the court weighed the public and private interests while
acknowledging that private property owners may lose "some potential for the
use or economic exploitation of private property" to accommodate the public
welfare.' 6 The court noted the "serious public health and welfare concern"
related to nuclear waste disposal and found it reasonable that the government
delay drilling until the potential dangers of drilling could be determined.
8 7
The Bass Enterprises opinion incorporated the concerns ofAgins first prong,
by ensuring that the governmental action was not arbitrary and substantially
advanced a legitimate state interest by analyzing the public interests involved,
and came to a determination in line with an Agins analysis.'
b. Distinct Investment-Backed Expectations
The plaintiffs investment-backed expectations supported a finding of
a taking because the sole purpose of entering into the lease was to remove the
oil and gas for profit. Although the federal government retained ownership
of the surface rights, the court held the plaintiff's expectations of drilling
were reasonable under the regulations and lease provisions governing mining
at that time. 89 Under this factor, the court recognized the concern that Bass
::4 See supra Part V.C.
's See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'] Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Commission,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
"' Bass Enterprises, 54 Fed. Cl. at 403 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979)).18 7 Id.
'88 Id. at 403-04.89 Id. at 403.
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Enterprises had individually been deprived of its investment-backed ex-
pectations and that weighed in favor of a taking.
c. Economic Impact
The final Penn Central factor addressed the fundamental concern of
takings claims by determining how badly the plaintiff was economically
injured by the government action. Agins second prong, concerning the denial
of all economically viable use of property, was incorporated into this
factor. 90 The court determined the economic impact of the forty-five month
delay to be $1,137,808.191 The court recognized the concern reflected in
Mahon that "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law."'192 The court determined the final economic
impact of the permit delay by creating a percentage with the economic impact
on the plaintiff, $1,137,808, as the numerator, and then divided by the value
of the property without the encumbrance, $22,000,000, making the plaintiff s
economic impact roughly five percent of the property value. 93 The court's
analysis ensures that the government action did not dramatically injure an
individual property owner while realistically allowing for government actions
to negatively effect that owner economically as a side effect of government
regulation. The economic concern reflected in Agins' second prong and the
categorical rule in Lucas were adequately addressed by the Bass Enterprises
court without requiring it to determine what amounts to a denial of all
economically viable use.
3. Bass Enterprises: Model for the Future
Bass Enterprises analyzed the regulatory takings claim in a simple,
direct and thoughtful manner. In doing so, the opinion was a model for other
courts when dealing with regulatory takings claims. The Supreme Court's
previous decisions failed to explicitly direct lower courts to use Penn Central
190 Id. (explaining that economic impact "is more commonly referred to as a denial of
'economically viable use of land."' (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225, 260
(1980)).
191 Id. at 404.
192 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922).
9 Bass Enterprises, 54 Fed. Cl. at 404.
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as the sole means of analyzing regulatory takings claims. Yet, Bass
Enterprises demonstrated that, with adequate direction, potential parties and
lower courts will have a more structured and explicitly defined balancing test
to be applied in every regulatory takings situation. This approach would
create certainty for the parties on what information the courts would address
and how to properly argue their claims, and would create uniformity in lower
courts' applications of the Fifth Amendment.
E. Following the Leader IV: Justice Brennan on Track in Penn Central
Rose Acres Farm, Inc. v. United States'94 explicitly applied Penn
Central 's factors in its analysis of federal regulations on chicken farms sus-
pected of selling eggs containing salmonella. The case also addressed a
temporary takings claim when plaintiff's hen houses were required to remain
unused while being cleaned prior to inspection. Tahoe-Sierra's recent
affirmation of Penn Central as the appropriate test surely weighed in the
decision to apply the Penn Central test. Rose Acres demonstrated how vital
government regulations, such as health protections, are protected under
Tahoe-Sierra. Yet, it is also evident from the RoseAcres opinion that takings
jurisprudence is fully capable of compensating for legitimate claims where
the government has regulated property to the point it should be considered
taken.
1. Facts
Rose Acres produced large quantities of eggs for markets in the
Midwest. 196 Its system of operation was vertically integrated, highly
structured, and any disruption in the process affected the entire facility. 197
Salmonella regulations were imposed by the Secretary of Agriculture. 98 The
regulations limited where and for what purposes facilities suspected of
contamination could sell eggs, and also imposed quarantine, testing, cleaning,
and possible retesting requirements. 99 After salmonella outbreaks in the early
94 55 Fed. CI. 643, 657 (2003).
1 Id. at 660.
'96 Id. at 646.
' Id. at 647.
'
9 Id. at 648.
'99 Id. at 648-50.
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1990s were traced back to Rose Acres, it was subjected to the regulations. 00
The plaintiff attempted to meet the regulatory requirements by testing
chickens; most failed to test positive in two consecutive organ tests, resulting
in a total of 6,741 hens being killed for testing, of which only 147 tested
positive. 20 1 The cleaning of the hen houses required wet cleaning, which was
more expensive than the dry cleaning typically done, and resulted in some
electrical damage that partially burned a hen house.02 The regulations were
imposed on the plaintiff for over twenty-one months.20 3
As a result of the regulations, Rose Acres suffered significant losses.
The company was forced to sell its eggs in the less profitable, but safer for
human consumption, breaker egg market, whereas prior to the regulations it
sold ninety-seven percent of its eggs in the more profitable table egg
market .2 ' The forced sale of eggs in the breaker market resulted in a 13.5
cent loss in profit per dozen eggs for the 57.5 million dozens diverted to the
breaker egg market.0 5 The plaintiff also built a six million dollar facility to
process eggs for the breaker egg market and to minimize its losses in the
breaker market. 6
Rose Acres asserted that the Secretary of Agriculture's actions
constituted a regulatory taking of its healthy eggs and hen houses, and a
categorical taking of its hens.20 7 The court recognized that the Supreme Court
"identified significant factors for consideration" in Penn Central and referred
to the Penn Central factors as "the best method for determining plaintiff's
egg-related claim."2 "8 The court separated its analysis of the regulatory
takings claims into discussions regarding the eggs and hen houses.
2. Penn Central Contemplated all the Appropriate Considerations
a. Economic Impact
The court addressed each Penn Central factor explicitly in its analysis
of the regulatory taking of Rose Acres' eggs. The economic impact of the
200 Rose Acres, 55 Fed. C1. at 650-5 1.
201 Id. at 651.
202 Id.
203 id.
204 Id. at 651-52.
211 Id. at 652.
206 Rose Acres, 55 Fed. C1. at 652.
207 Id. at 653.
208 Id. at 657.
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regulation was designed to allow for government regulation while placing
limits on the government when regulations essentially remove all value from
property through those regulations. The court recognized this balance when
it said the "[pjlaintiff must show a serious financial loss from the regulatory
imposition."2 9 The government's expert witness stated that the breaker egg
market was less profitable than the table egg market, and estimated the loss
from the diversion into the breaker market at $9.2 million. 210 The regulations
substantially impacted the plaintiff's profits, accordingly the economic im-
pact of the regulation weighed in favor of finding a taking.2 1'
b. Distinct Investment-Backed Expectations
The court next addressed Rose Acres' investment-backed expectations.
This factor holds plaintiffs accountable for any regulations they should have
reasonably expected when they began business. Rose Acres contended they
expected to be able to sell healthy eggs in the table egg market;2|2 the govern-
ment responded by arguing that the plaintiff knew the poultry industry was
heavily regulated and that Rose Acres knew it could be subjected to more
stringent regulations in the future.21 3 The court summarized the history of egg
regulations and found that although the industry was heavily regulated prior
to 1990, the regulations did not address salmonella in eggs.214 The court held
that the plaintiff reasonably expected to sell healthy eggs in the table egg
market, and that the history of government regulation deciding a grading
system provided a solution to the problem of salmonella in eggs made any
change in the regulatory scheme unforeseeable. 2 5 Thus, the investment-
backed expectations also weighed in favor of the plaintiff.216
c. Character of the Governmental Action
Finally, the court addressed the character of the government action to
identify the policy of the regulation and to determine if exercising that policy
2
" d. (citing Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177 (1994)).
210 Id. at 658.
211 See id.
212 Rose Acres, 55 Fed. C1. at 658-59.
213 Id. at 659.
2141d.
21
5 Id.
216 [d.
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could be characterized as exercising a legitimate police power of the state, or
if the policy was simply singling out certain individuals without sufficient
justification.217 The court determined that the regulations were not based on
sound science and that the science failed to link the regulations to the strong
public policy concern that food be safe for consumption. 21 8 The regulation
also appeared to single out certain egg producers. The court found over one
thousand large flocks nationwide contained salmonella, ofwhich thirty-eight
were restricted and 1.3 billion eggs diverted to the breaker market.1 9 Of the
eggs diverted to the breaker market, over half were from the plaintiff.
220
Based upon these facts, the court determined that the government action was
not sufficiently linked to a legitimate public policy goal and thus, the third
factor weighed in favor of the plaintiff.21 All three factors acknowledge that
the plaintiff was hit especially hard by these regulations and the court found
that the regulation amounted to a taking of the plaintiff's healthy eggs, for
which just compensation was due in the amount of $7,376,050.77 after
offsetting the revenue received in the breaker market.222
The plaintiff also claimed the hen houses were taken while being
quarantined and cleaned.223 The houses were eventually reopened so the court
addressed the claim as a temporary takings claim under Tahoe-Sierra.24 The
court had dismissed the regulations as being scientifically "misguided," but
recognized that waiting in general does not "constitute a valid claim for the
taking ofplaintiffs houses. 225 Even though the court acknowledged the basis
for the delays was unfounded, the delay itself was not compensable under
Tahoe-Sierra because of the enormous impact that classifying delays as
takings would have on government regulations of all types.226 Decisions of
this type demonstrate the fundamental premise that government must work,
and without the ability to cause delays, government would be crippled.
217 Id.
28 Rose Acres, 55 Fed. CI. at 660.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 663-64.
223 Id. at 660.
224 Rose Acres, 55 Fed. C1. at 660.
22 5 Id. at 661.
226 Id.
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3. Penn Central: Better Than Per Se Rules
Rose Acres demonstrated a proper analysis of Penn Central and the
importance of Tahoe-Sierra in affirming temporary delays as an unfortunate
but necessary part of government regulation. Government regulations based
on inaccurate premises, inadequate science, or poor implementing schemes,
like the ones at issue in Rose Acres, are properly addressed in the structure of
the Penn Central balancing test. Concerns reflected in the governmental
regulation's goal of public health and in the Fifth Amendment's goal of
protecting property owners can be weighed, and a determination made, as to
which goal should prevail in any one particular circumstance to reach a just
result.
F. Following the Leader V. More Steps Needed After Tahoe-Sierra
1. Facts
Currier Builders, Inc. v. Town of York227 addressed a local town decision
to impose regulations to limit its growth, and demonstrated how Tahoe-
Sierra 's refusal to temporally divide property interests has enabled local land
use policies to be successfully implemented. York, a town of approximately
13,000, experienced significant growth in the 1990s.22 To manage this
growth, York implemented a permit program to limit the number of
residential building permits approved to seven per month.229 The program
also limited permit approval to two per month within any single subdivision
and only one permit application for any person outside a subdivision.23 ° York
limited the permit ordinance terms to a three-year existence unless an exten-
sion was approved by a vote at a special or general referendum election.
2 31
The court determined the approximate wait for a non-subdivision permit was
almost two years, while a permit for a multi-family building was six months
to a year, but no construction could begin before a party obtained permit
approval.232 Both parties moved for summary judgment.
227 No. 01-68-PC, 2002 WL 1146773 (D. Me. May 30, 2002).
228 Id. at *2.
229 Id.
230Id.
211 Id. at *3.
232 Id. at *4.
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2. Tahoe-Sierra: Deemed Many Regulations not Takings
The Currier court held that a facial takings claim fails due to Tahoe-
Sierra.233 The court compared the thirty-two month moratorium in Tahoe-
Sierra which was held to not be a taking, and concluded that the ordinance
in York was much less restrictive of property owners than the moratorium in
Tahoe-Sierra.2 34 The ordinance allowed eighty-four permits to be issued each
year, which was much more development than the complete ban on develop-
ment in Tahoe-Sierra.2 35 Additionally, the ordinance expired in three years
if not renewed.236 In comparing the restrictions placed on property owners in
Tahoe-Sierra and those in Currier, the court determined "the more restrictive
moratorium in Tahoe-Sierra compels the conclusion that the defendant is
entitled to summary judgment on the facial" regulatory takings claim.237
Currier Builders' motion for summary judgment against the ordinance
as applied to the builder failed. The court appropriately held that the "Penn
Central analysis must be applied" in regulatory challenges.2 38 Due to the
nature of summary judgment, the court noted that the economic impact on
Currier Builders, and the ordinances interference with Currier Builders'
distinct investment-backed expectations, were ardently disputed by the parties
with evidence supporting both sides, and that "[t]he court may not reach a
conclusion under Penn Central by applying only one of the three factors. ' '239
The court correctly denied the motion for summary judgment and held that
evaluation of the Penn Central factors is the proper method of analysis in
trial for the regulatory takings claim made by the plaintiff.
In Currier, the court addressed a situation where local government
implemented the land use controls that its constituents deemed best for the
town. Unlike state and federal governments who have the wealth to pay for
takings, when local ordinances restricting property owners' rights are held
to be taking such ordinances would be prohibited by the prohibitively high
cost to local governments of paying for regulatory takings. Tahoe-Sierra 's
reaffirmation of Penn Central as the test for regulatory takings ensures that
233 Currier, 2002 WL 1146773 at *9.
234 Id. at *9.
2351d.
237 Id.
23 Id. at *10.
239 Currier, 2002 WL 1146773 at *10.
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proper attention to both the impact on property owners and the means used
by the government to implement its goals will be taken into account.
Although in certain instances local land use policies may go too far in their
regulations, the officials responsible for such local plans can easily be held
politically accountable for their actions if disapproved of by the locality. The
Supreme Court's guidance in this area could be clearer. As the Currier court
noted, the Court has given "some, but not too specific, guidance to courts
confronted with deciding whether a particular government action goes too far
and effects a regulatory taking."2" The Currier court appropriately applied
the Penn Central factors for its resolution of the motion for summary
judgment.
V. CONCLUSION
Tahoe-Sierra's significance lies in noting thejurisprudence it affirmed,
rather than focusing on its lack of groundbreaking Constitutional inter-
pretation. Although limited by the narrow grant of certiorari, the decision
affirmed the parcel as a whole doctrine and the Penn Central factors as the
foundation of regulatory takings challenges. Justice Stevens did not forge
new ground, but instead refocused on the appropriate existing legal rules that
should be used to adjudicate regulatory takings challenges to clarify the area's
jurisprudence for future litigants and lower courts.
The history of the Supreme Court's regulatory takingsjurisprudence was
at best composed of many factors, at worst ajumbled mass of opinions with
seemingly little common thread except for an attempt to find a balance
between private rights and public power. Tahoe-Sierra's place in that juris-
prudence is one of simplification. The appropriate piece of property at issue
for the taking is the parcel as a whole, undivided temporally, horizontally,
vertically, or any other way it could be divided. The appropriate factors to be
considered were laid out in Penn Central and should govern all regulatory
takings challenges. Tahoe-Sierra provided clarification for lower courts on
what framework should be used when balancing the public and private
interests inherent in regulatory takings cases.
The importance of Tahoe-Sierra for environmental law and land use
policy can best be understood through an examination of lower court
opinions following Tahoe-Sierra and analyzing how an alternative decision
240 Id. at *7.
2012003]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
in Tahoe-Sierra could have affected important environmental legislation. The
Court's affirmation of the parcel as a whole doctrine was needed for environ-
mental regulation to continue, and a decision which allowed division of a
parcel into smaller pieces, either geographically or temporally, would have
created a situation where implementing federal environmental programs
would effect a taking in almost all situations. That potential for erosion of
environmental protection was demonstrated in Seiber for protection of spot-
ted owl habitat and in Walcek for wetlands regulation under the Clean Water
Act.24' Even after the facially clear mandate from Tahoe-Sierra that "in the
analysis of regulatory takings claim ... we must focus on 'the parcel as a
whole, ' " '42 the Machipongo decision addressed the difficulty some fact
patterns create for courts deciding what the parcel was, and remanded its'
case with instructions to consider a number of factors in determining the
parcel as a whole.4 3
The difficulty the Machipongo court had in determining the parcel as
a whole demonstrated the intrinsic problem of creating clear tests in an
amorphous area such as regulatory takings, and also demonstrated the need
for continued clarification from the Supreme Court to determine what
constitutes a parcel as a whole. Clearly, allowing separate legal title under
one person of adjacent property would undermine the parcel as a whole
doctrine, but what about circumstances in which husband and wife, or parent
and subsidiary corporations have separate title to adjacent or nearbyproperty?
What lines are to be drawn to define the limits of the parcel? The factors
considered by the Machipongo court raise questions the Supreme Court
should address to help further delineate what constitutes a parcel as a whole
for Fifth Amendment purposes.
Tahoe-Sierra 's affirmation of Penn Central as the appropriate test for
regulatory takings appears to have influenced lower courts, but some courts
continue to utilize additional factors that represent interests that are taken into
account under Penn Central. Bass Enterprises and Rose Acres are examples
of courts strictly following the Supreme Court's decision and explicitly
applying the three Penn Central factors in its analysis. However, in Seiber we
saw a court continue to address factors outside of Penn Central, which
241 See supra Part IV.A. & IV.C.
22 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327
2002).
"' Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751, 775 (Pa. 2002).
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demonstrates that Tahoe-Sierra's influence in establishing the Penn Central
factors as the sole regulatory takings test is limited.
Tahoe-Sierra's decision was also vital for its clear acknowledgment
that government cannot be forced to pay for limitations and delays on
development. Currier addressed local land use policies implemented by a
town that allowed development, but limited it and created delays for many
potential builders. The Currier court noted that the restrictions it was
considering were less restrictive than those in question in Tahoe-Sierra and
therefore could not be found to be a taking. City planners and environmental
development planners, such as in Tahoe-Sierra, can make plans knowing that
delays or prohibitions up to thirty-two months are not regulatory takings and
plan accordingly.
